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Abstract — V2G model goes beyond V2C model and
proposes an entrepreneur’s personal view of the risks and
returns as compared to that of the firm’s risks-return tradeoffs. At the growth stages, the partnership of co-entrepreneurs
and VC or IPO also means risk sharing for the original
entrepreneur or founder. Larger group of founders and early
stage actors allow the entrepreneur to consider him or herself
differently, even lower the “risk” of his or her job than the
traditional entrepreneurs. V2G model combine the best parts
of the roles as an entrepreneur (owner) and hired manager.
Thus, in this case, it is not any more only “your” firm, but a
rapidly-growing enterprise with the corresponding V2G
mindset. This V2G mindset avoids negative effect of a single
owner. The separation of the roles of the owner and manager
will allow the entrepreneur-founder to adequately cope with
them. In sum, V2G model points out three proposals: first, it
examines risks and returns from entrepreneur’s individual
viewpoint; secondly it explores risks and ambitions between
individual and enterprise; and finally it describes the
importance of the ownership development of the enterprise
and development of the value of the enterprise.
Keywords — entrepreneurship, growth venture, ownership,
governance, Venture-to-Capital, V2C

I. INTRODUCTION
A. Growth Venturing
The rapid rate of globalization and quickening pace of
technological innovation expose new venture activity to
fresh challenges. It is no longer logical to maintain that
firms aspiring to grow focus on domestic growth first and
on incremental internationalization later on. The increasing
velocity of change in knowledge-intensive societies and
firms may have also intensified the need for, and the speed
of, growth at home and international markets at the same
time. Despite these changes in business and society, the
discussion around entrepreneurship has remained associated
with niche marketing, limited business outlook, ad-hoc and
intuitive strategies, lack of resources and capabilities as
well as over-reliance on the owner-manager’s own initial
competencies. The exceptions to these are the recent
theoretical discussions and empirical findings regarding
Born Globals and International New Ventures as well as
V2C models (Venture-To-Capital) [among others e.g. 1, 2,
3]. This paper will build on the latter research and model-

building tradition by proposing a framework for growth
venturing (or Venture-To-Growth – simply V2G) that starts
with V2C and focuses on influential issues that impact the
rate and pattern of rapid growth. The V2G proposes four
families of factors, the shortage of which adversely
influence growth. We refer to each shortage as a “Gap” [4]
and empirically examine eight in depth case-firms for their
implications and insights.
B. The Entrepreneurial Choice
Historically, entrepreneurs have created jobs for
themselves and family members, employment for others,
and wealth for the family and their regions as a whole
gradually. Creation and preservation of family wealth has
been the primary objective over time. Etemad [5] suggests
that most of the successful firms, which grew to become
regional and international, were local family firms at the
beginning. This traditional growth path goes back to the
local artisans, merchants and traders on the famed Silk
Road, dating to 500 to 1000 B.C., that dominated the Far
East and Middle East before extending to the Greek and
Roman empires.
The examples of successful family firms, such as
Medici’s, Farnese, Della Rovere’ (started in current Italy),
Rothschild’s
(current
Germany),
Armstrong’s,
Chippendales and Parsons (current England), Ford,
Carnegies and Rockefellers (the US) started from humble
beginnings at home and expanded to their respective
continent and beyond. The initial patriarchs of these
families, similar to a host of others, were entrepreneurs:
they aspired to create jobs, income and wealth for
themselves, family, and then for others. However, not all
family firms go on to become large international
companies.
There comes a time that the initial entrepreneurs face the
entrepreneurial choice between status quo, maintaining a
secure and accomplished family firm in a steady-state,
growing even further, or even bowing out. Thus not all
family firms become the instrument of growth. Nor do all
entrepreneurs become empire builders. In the process of
building a firm, family or otherwise, some entrepreneurs
grow the family firm and become content with it. Others
evolve to adopt entrepreneurship as a way of life or a lifetime challenge and vocation. They go-on to become the
builders of many new firms of their own choosing. They
may even become serial or “professional” entrepreneurs
and co-entrepreneurs at their own volition; and thereby
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bring the much-needed wealth of knowledge, experience
and social networks to a new start-up firm. In that process,
they overcome many of the traditional shortcomings
associated with the fresh and young entrepreneurial startups. Naturally, they bridge many gaps and chasms on the
road to building growing companies at much faster pace, as
they do not loose time to mistakes and set-backs.
On the other side of the coin, aspiring ventures also face
the choice in the selection of their entrepreneurial team:
e.g., between the team that aims for IPO as exist and the
one that can help the firm to that rise beyond IPO and aims
for V2G. This main objective of this research is to examine
a range of such entrepreneurial choices, especially within
the proposed V2G framework.
II. NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
A. Gap Reduction Approach
A fundamental assumption underlying the growth
venturing (or venturing to growth or V2G) is that actors in,
and around the growth venture, including the ownermanagers, are committed to growth because of their belief
that the growth objectives of the venture are more important
than those of the entrepreneur [6]. However, without the
entrepreneurial drive, dedication and commitment, which
can be viewed analogous to a strong sense of ownership, a
start-up would face even greater difficulties. The desire of
some (traditional) entrepreneurs, mainly as a “lonely-rider”
type or in family-owed and run firms, are to primarily
secure personal or family wealth as opposed to growing the
wealth of the venture. Thus, not all or majority of the new
companies do want to grow fast. It is possible to argue that
when there is one entrepreneur, or very few in the
entrepreneurial team, both the entrepreneur(s) and the firm
grow together. However, the presumed theoretical
discordance between their respective objectives may
eventually lead to diverging trajectories. Such discordance,
if not divergence, in the extant literature suggests that there
exists potential shortcoming(s) in both the mindset and the
required qualities of the starting entrepreneurs in the
beginning for the growth venturing to proceed. This
suggests that there exists a combination of EntrepreneurialManagerial Gap. However, the venture may face other
shortcomings as well. The venture's ability to grow is
undoubtedly dependent on its ability to add sufficient
managerial capacity to manage the growth processes
[among others e.g. 7, 8, 9]. This suggests that enterprise
may face a problem in the delivery of adequate
entrepreneurial and managerial services to the firm, both of
which are crucial to a venture's sustained long-term growth.
It is also assumed that a venture grows faster when it has
enough capital resources and capabilities of its own to do
so; or it takes steps acquire them in order to narrow its
Resource-Capability Gap. Naturally, it grows even faster if
it has enough information and knowledge [10] or
systematically narrows its Information-Knowledge Gap.
Mason and Harrison [11] suggest that many ventures are
unsuccessful in raising equity finance because they are not
ready for receiving such investments. Similarly, Seppä and
Näsi [3] state that “it is ironic that there is no shortage of

capital now; but there is a shortage of small-enough doses
of it”, which point to the presence of the Equity Gap. When
the company’s stocks are intended for acquiring necessary
resources and capabilities for further growth, this intention
influences the ownership structure of the company. Stated
differently, the founder-manager can utilize their
entrepreneurial capital to access to incremental financial
and knowledge resources; and thereby reduce both the
resource-capability and knowledge-information gaps. Such
injection and usage of equity helps the firm to develop
quicker for becoming a publicly-traded company. However,
the classical story of an entrepreneurial firm suggests that
the entire authority over the venture is at the founder’s
command; or one person has all the authority and makes all
the crucial decisions. In such cases, there is bound to be
gaps between requirements of the new investors and the
owner-entrepreneur. Therefore, the governance principles
must be consistently developed to enable faster growth.
This Structure-Governance Gap can be viewed in more
reflective light as “a structure-conduct-governance”
paradigm, where the changes in equity capital or ownership
structure influence the governance principles of the
enterprise. Ownership also tends to determine the balance
of power between shareholders. Such balance reinforce the
goals and risks of the shareholders, which in turn influences
the nature of decisions and impacts firm’s strategies and
consequent growth rates [6].
B. Venture-To-Capital (V2C)
Seppä [12] illustrated “the VC spiral” that results in the
growth in size of the average venture capitalist (VC) funds
raised by a successful VC and in the consequent growth of
the minimum amount of investment as well. Thus, the
capital gap problem relates to the distance between a
prospective venture and an investable venture. As stated
earlier, Seppä and Näsi [3] observe that there is a shortage
of small-enough doses of capital. Thus, family and personal
savings remain the most important source of start-up
funding, with venture capital playing a greater role in the
early growth phase rather than in the start-up phase [13,
14]. Firms with a relative lack of tangible assets appear to
be financed through less formal means, where non-bank
financing (loans from individuals unrelated to business)
plays a more important role in the capital structure of the
start-ups. This emphasizes the importance of network
resources in this type of ventures [15].
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FIGURE 1: THE KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION GAP [16]

Rasila, Seppä and Hannula [16], and Rasila [17]
introduced the equity gap that suggests the minimum
investment limit is too high for young ventures. The reality
of the equity gap (see Figure 1) can be seen as a negative
phenomenon, as a shortage of adequate financing in the
early stages of the life cycle. The equity gap is obvious and
problematic for new ventures which seek rather small initial
investment. As noted earlier, one strategic management
implication of the Penrose effect [7] is that a fast-growing
organization tends to stagnate due to managerial limitations
(e.g., a part of the Entrepreneurial-Managerial gap). Thus,
there is also a shortage of managerial competences,
attention and time. This is called knowledge gap here (see
Figure 1).

FIGURE 2: V2C MODEL [3]

Seppä and Näsi [3] described a V2C model which is
distinguished from playing solo (where the lone
entrepreneur owns all the shares) and pushed by VC
models. This Venture-To-Capital (or simply V2C) model
described the basic orientation of growth venturing, where
distribution of ownership is faster than the other two
models because ultimately the ownership is widespread
anyway (e.g. IPO, MBO and LBO). On the other hand, the
width of the “gaps” calls for efforts to create a new
professional actor. Figure 2 provides an illustration of the
space for V2C to fulfill in the process of accelerating
ventures from idea to IPO [3].

t/a

FIGURE 3: THE EXPECTED TRAJECTORIES OF VALUE OF THE
FIRM OVER TIME [16]

The role of the entrepreneur is still vital but not as
dominant as in the traditional view of growth venturing. In
the context of growth venturing, it is assumed that a venture
grows faster when it has enough capital of its own to do so.
Naturally, the venture is not expected to grow rapidly
without additional investments. Therefore, a venture grows
even faster if it is also accelerated by V2C (Figure 3),
which operates between the inception of a venture and the
moment when it becomes attractive to formal venture
capital financing. The V2C operative fills especially “the
knowledge gap” or, as Penrose [7] called it, “the managerial
limitations”.
C. Different Entrepreneurial Risks and Mindsets
Growth venturing is risky business in which stakeholders
invest time, knowledge and money. In addition, various
players are involved in the venture with different goals and
attitudes to risks. For this study, the most interesting actors
are, first and foremost, entrepreneurs (including founders),
co-entrepreneurs, business angels and venture capitalists.
They are deeply involved in the venture investing time,
money and knowledge. They also carry the risks, but they
reap the anticipated benefits.
For other players, such as banks, there are different tools
to manage risks and, therefore, they do not necessarily
absorb large risks. For the entrepreneur, the risk means
walking away from a secure job and a career path.
Although in the modern world, there is no longer such a
thing as a career path of secure jobs. In addition, starting up
a firm could be the only way to get a job. Personal risk also
means that an entrepreneur is taking her or himself and her
or his family into an unfamiliar storm of stress and
uncertainty. However, for other players, this is just a job or
a hobby. For professional stakeholders, risk management is
a part of their job and they have a set of tools at their
disposal for managing it (e.g. investment criteria,
continuous monitoring and portfolio management).
Risk and investment in the venture influence the mindset
of the strategy makers. Indeed, non-owner managers need
to show their position, which explains their tendency to
favor riskier growth strategies than their non-managerial
counterparts [18]. On the other hand, an entrepreneur might
choose the best for the family and not the best for the
venture. In general, investments can be considered as
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investment of money and knowledge (time).
Traditionally, there have been main types of
entrepreneurs, ranging from life-style entrepreneur to
traditional entrepreneur and serial or professional
entrepreneurs. As entrepreneurs evolve, they learn how to
transfer a part of the undesired risks inherent in
entrepreneurial venture to others. For example and as
discussed earlier, the entrepreneur in a start-up situation has
no choice to bear the entrepreneurial risk personally as the
young firm has no capacity to absorb it. A traditional view
of the entrepreneur represents this situation, which is
depicted in the south east quadrant of Figure 4.
With growth, however, the firm can begin to absorb more
risks and the entrepreneur can transfer a part of the
entrepreneurial risk to the firm. Life-style firms, where the
entrepreneur manages the firm in a stable and steady
fashion, bear all the risks. They populate a part of the
South-West quadrant in Figure 4. Naturally, growth
exposes both the firm and the entrepreneur to additional
risks. While professional and serial entrepreneurs mange
risks in a comfortable zone (depicted at the centre of Figure
4) and possibly transfer their personal risk exposure to the
firm (as in the North-West quadrant of Figure 4), the
speculative-type growth may not be able to do so. Growth
in this type firms exposes the entrepreneur to large risks (as
depicted in the North-East quadrant of Figure 4). Stated
differently, entrepreneurs face different family of choice
and they conduct themselves differently, which results in
placing their respective firms in different positions in
Figure 4. We will use this framework to further explore
risk-growth-entrepreneurial choice interactions later on.
Company Risk
High

Speculative
growth

High growth

Personal Risk

Comfortable
growth

Low

No growth
ambitions

High

Slow growth
(risk-averse)

Low

FIGURE 4: A SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF FOUR POSSIBLE
STATES OF PERSONAL-COMPANY RISK TRADE-OFFS BASED ON
RANGE OF ENTREPRENEURIAL CHOICE.

III.

EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AND FINDINGS

A. Methods
The empirical evidence of this research consists of eight
in-dept and longitudinal case studies of rapidly growing and
internationalizing young enterprises (RIEs) in Canada.
These cases are selected from the six annual public lists of
the Profit’s “Top100 Fastest Growing Enterprises in
Canada”, spanning over the years 2000 to 2005. These lists
are well-known and rank the growth of Canada's

entrepreneurial companies annually, based on the growth in
revenue over a five-year period to avoid temporary
fluctuations. Firms included in this study have grown very
rapidly by any standard. Their average five-year growth
rate is over 9800% (or over 150% on annual basis) and
median internationalization is over 80% of gross revenue.
Although, the inclusion of only publicly-held companies in
the study could be viewed as a limitation, we decided in
favor of completeness and accuracy of publicly-held
information (such as public securities documents and
information filed by public companies and investment
funds with the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) in
The System for Electronic Document Analysis and
Retrieval filing system) as it enables us to examine and
better understand the role of the ownership in the resourceconstrained start-ups. The methods include careful criteria
for selection of diverse RIEs to ensure broader applicability
of findings. The selected vital statistics of each case-firm,
based on in-depth and longitudinal development of the
cases from the inception, spanning between six to 12 years,
are highlighted in Table 1.
TABLE 1
SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CASE-FIRMS.
Five
Revenue
Foundati
IPO or
Company
year
2005
on
Listin
Name
growth
Canadian $
(Preg
rate
seed)
1.AirIQ Inc.
3,014%
$40 million
1997
2001
2.Carmanah
Technologies
Inc.
3.DTI Dental
Technology
Inc.
4.Extreme
CCTV Inc.
5.Garda World
Security Inc.
6.Pethealth Inc.

3,669%

$39 million

1997
(1994)

2001

2,570%

$35 million

1996

1999

12,735%

$24 million

1994

2002

9,452%

$259
million
$14 million

1994

1999

1999

1999

7.TLC Vision
Inc.
8.Western
Financial
Group Inc.

28,938%

$303
million
$64 million

1993

1997

1996

1996

8,306%

9,647%

B. The Impact of Electronic business: E-Commerce is”
business as usual” for RIEs
The empirical examination of case-firms reveals
innovative, yet with theoretically consistent strategies,
portraying patterns, which explain the entrepreneurial
mindset in these younger rapidly growing firms. Consider
the following selective examples. The central common
business platform that supports AirIQ’s telematic-related
services on which the prevailing position of a mobile asset
is stored, and from which, that position is reported (or
further processed) is web-based or Internet-assisted. This
allows mobile clients to access and transfer that information
to their mobile devices easily and regardless of their
location. Therefore, once the client has become part of the
system, the Internet acts as the distribution channel for
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machine-to-machine transfer of telematic information.. The
Internet-Based Facilities (IBFs) and Technologies (IBTs)
have enabled AirIQ to expand beyond the traditional
channels for delivering its (telematic) services on real time
and continuous basis practically everywhere. The extensive
use of the IBFs and IBTs have allowed AirIQ to bridge the
time and space that have traditionally acted as barriers,
especially to smaller and younger firms for providing
services on demand everywhere as such smaller younger
firms cannot establish a physical presence earlier-on in their
lives.
Pethealth’s own IBFs and ITBs enable pet owners to
conveniently subscribe to Pethealth services, pay their
premiums and register a claim all on-line. Similarly,
veterinary clinics can report pet’s health status and place an
expense claim online and avoid the paper work and waste
of time conveniently. In fact, the Internet and customized
IBFs and ITBs have at least complemented, and in some
cases substituted for, some functions of the distribution
channels with little regard for the timing and the location of
the pet, pet owner, veterinary clinics and other buyers and
suppliers. Pethealth services are available at all times where
there is access to the Internet. In that process, they have
bridged over time and distance and subsumed the mode of
entry discussions by default. Pethealth’s information
databases that support all of its services can be viewed as its
common business platform is also online.
Carmanah uses multiple and parallel channels for
communication (e.g., interactive web-site, 1-800 number as
well as local agents and distributors) from which a
customer can choose depending on his preferences and
needs. This is a typical pattern of information dissemination
and distribution channel in rapidly-internationalizing firms.
In light of e-commerce-enabled and interactive web-sites,
the traditional concept of mode of entry has lost their
conventional importance. Clients decide as to which
channel to use and then the firms IBFs and IBTs assist and
augment the process.
Although electronic commerce (E-Commerce) is central
to AirIQ’s and Pethealth’s business models, their own
customized IBFs and IBTs also play crucial and
complementary roles in their respective E-Commerce
platforms. In practically all RIEs in our samples, ECommerce has become the “business as usual”, especially
when electronic business is integrated with the legacy
systems, especially in the older industries such as guarding
(e.g., in case of case-firm Garda). In fact, the role of ECommerce is even more pronounced when it comes to
knowledge-intensive businesses as well as services that can
be delivered in digital formats. Once the firm meets the
challenge of transforming its business to a digital format
and deploys an E-Commerce platforms, it can offer them at
all times and everywhere with the help of its own IBTs and
IBfs that also enable further customization and adaptation
to customer needs. Our in-depth case studies points to
presence of E-Commerce platform augmented with each
firms’ own customized IBTs and IBFs in all of the RIEs in
the study.

C. Gap reduction findings
All studied cases went public very early in their life cycle
when the firms were relatively small (average revenue
under $4 million and median $2,4 million). This finding
suggests that publicly-raised equity were used to remedy
the young firm’s constrained resources, which has
historically impeded these firms’ growth. Consider, for
example, that the publicly-raised funds could be used for
acquiring productive resource early-on, which implies that
the mindset and the governance structures of these
companies had evolved beyond a single shareholder in
favor of a smaller stake in a growing and larger company.
This transformation has three immediate advantages:
i) the firm avails itself for relatively-inexpensive public
funds earlier, which allows it to acquire the necessary
resources and capabilities earlier and relatively cheaply and
thus bridge its Resource-Capability Gap sooner and faster
than relying on private sources of funds.
ii) The preparation for early IPO puts the firm on
different footing regarding its management and governance
structure as the entrepreneur or the initial entrepreneurial
team prepares to become publicly accountable sooner with
a profound positive impact on the firm’s governance in the
early stages for early listing. And,
iii), this re-orientation is bound to have positive effect on
closing the Structure-Governance Gap as well. Another
potential benefit of earlier listing is that it may influence the
founders or co-entrepreneurs to bring experienced people
on board earlier. Most of the entrepreneurs and coentrepreneurs of our case-firms were highly-experienced
and successful entrepreneurs and executives in their prior
engagements. Most of them had founded their firm by
harnessing the social capital of their social network in terms
of acquisition of financing, attracting strategic partners and
even in engaging key executives. Our Case-firms suggest
that this earlier changes help to bridge the EntrepreneurialManagerial Gap sooner and faster. Combined, the closure
of the gaps could out the firm on a higher growth trajectory.
The growth path of our case-firms clearly deviates from
the trajectory of young firms based the conventional
principle of entrepreneurial independence and strongly
gravitates towards interdependence, synergy and symbiosis
[19]. Consistent with that practice, the case firms have also
integrated newly-acquired competences (e.g., their senior
owner-executives) with the existing internal capabilities of
the firm and thus augmented their combined social capital,
further enhanced theirs social network and the
corresponding market knowledge and position as well as
their customer base. It also appears that most of these RIEs
combine multiple advantages and deploy a few dominant
theoretically-sound growth patterns, which are highly
information- and learning-intensive and customer-oriented,
resulting in much faster reduction of the InformationKnowledge Gap. Their overall growth patterns, however,
do not easily fit into the extant growth or
internationalization theories.
D. Findings #1: Personal view
Our data of RIEs contains 10 primary founders or co-
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entrepreneurs with have significant amount of shares and
central influence in the development of the firm’s rapid
growth. Eight were CEO’s and two in the executive
position such as VP Operations and VP Sales.
The average compensation of Profit Listed companies
were $288,231 in 2001 [20]. According to Statistics
Canada, the average salary for senior management
personnel in Canada was $100,950 per year in 2000. In UK
the average salary of a director of a small company (up to
£5m turnover) was £58 000 (about $133,000) in 2002 [21].
This information shows that the case companies’ top
executives (mainly CEO) earn more or less same (average
$132,000 and median $91,000) than average SME
executive in the year before IPO, but much more than
managers in an average SMEs after the IPO (i.e., on
average $286,000 vs. $101,000). Also, the median of
salaries ($195,000) goes above average top executive’s
salary only one year after IPO. In the fifth year after IPO, or
listing, the average annual salary and bonuses are about
$350,000 with the median of $279,000.
The specific information from case-firms is more
revealing. For example, the founder-director of TLC Vision
Inc. average returns were about $850,000 (from year before
IPO and for the next six years) versus the average annual
income of $140,000 for typical doctors in most provinces as
estimated by the Canadian Federation of Medical Students.
Thus, his annual compensation was 5-6 times higher than
the average doctor’s annual income in Canada after
graduation.
The average returns of another founder and CEO (of the
TLC Vision inc. with a BBA Certificated Accountant) was
about $450,000 vs. the average salary for CAs with
approximately 10 years' experience of $103,500, according
to the latest salary survey [22]. However, the salaried
partner drew about $142,500 in Ontario in 2005 [22].
Hence, on average, the TLC Executive’s annual salary and
bonus was three times higher than those with his education
level.
Consider Garda World Security, which issues new
options every year. Ten per cent (10%) of the Common
Shares of the capital stock of the Corporation that is
outstanding from time to time is reserved for the issuance
of stock options pursuant to the stock option plan of the
Corporation. Garda’s founder-CEO annual salary and
bonuses were $135,000 in third year after listing and
$883,000 in the sixth year. CEO’s non-exercised options
value at the end of the fiscal year 2005 was $4 million
(300 000 shares). In addition, he still hold 4,9 million
shares (19 %). At present his stock value is over $110
million (evaluated at $22.50, stock based on the Last Trade
At 9/26/2006 3:55pm). The cumulative shareholder’s value
on $100 investment in the August 1999 in Garda’s common
shares was $3,500 at the end of 2005. These evidences from
cases lead us to use the framework of risk-firmentrepreneurial choice trade-offs of Figure 4 to propose the
corresponding one pertaining to the personal view of risks
and rewards in the V2G model (see Figure 5). The list of
the significant states and their corresponding descriptions
are as follows:

• A – Foundation of the growth venture 1 (nascent
entrepreneur or serial entrepreneur)
• A’ – Foundation of the growth venture 2 (serial
entrepreneur)
• B – Comparison level as a director in SME (salary)
• C1 – Failure of the growth venture 1 before IPO
• D1 – Successful IPO of the growth venture 1
• A” – Foundation of the growth venture 3 (serial
entrepreneur)
• C2 – Failure of the growth venture 1 after IPO
• D2 – Successful growth of the company’s value
(exercised options)
• D3 – Successful partial or full exit (sales all the shares)
Salary, bonus, stock
options and shares
(exit) as entrepreneur

Performance
$ 15m

D3

$ 5m

D2

$1,5m
Success trajectory

$0,5m

D1

$150k

A’’

Salary
(as employee)

B

Failure trajectory

A’

A
$70k

C1
IPO / listing

C2
Exercised stock
options

Full or partial exit
(as owner)

Time

FIGURE 5: ENTREPRENEURS SUCCESS AND FAILURE
TRAJECTORIES

E. Findings #2 Risk of the entrepreneur and firm
The highlights of case-firms’ growth path can be
summarized in the following observation (forming a highly
realistic scenario, as follows):
i) The original founder’s average ownership share
declines from 35% (highest ownership stake is 45%) before
listing to 21% in the year of IPO and to less than 14% in
five years after IPO with the median of 10% (due the initial
founders selling shares to co-entrepreneurs and investors or
the corporation issues new shares over time).
ii) As a consequence and at the same time, they lowered
their personal risks as well as company risks when they
capitalize their “entrepreneurial capital” as venture capital
injections helps firms to weather the storm and survive
much better than otherwise.
iii) The firm had raised funds from VC or stock market
via IPO and private placements as early as possible. VC’s
role, which was more important in the seed and start-up
stages, became less important in the growth stage. At the
high growth stage the ventures were able to raise funds
from banks as the earlier success worked as collateral.
Funds from banks were certainly cheaper than those from
VC (for example, 6,5 % interest rate from Royal Bank of
Canada than 12 % from VC in the case of AirIQ Inc.).
The important finding, based on the above evidence, is
that the serial or “professional entrepreneurs” (e.g., Region
A in Figure 6) are exposed to a higher risks, but they do not
absorb personal risk. A typical traditional entrepreneur
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(e.g., Region B in Figure 6) is assumed to be risk-averse
and later raise its commitment. The “life-style
entrepreneurs” (e.g., Region D in Figure 6), is practically
bearing “no” personal risk as it is transferred to the firm.
Consequently, the general presumption regarding an
entrepreneur appears to have limited applicability in the
context of the framework presented in Figure 4. The
findings of this research and discussions supports the risk
Trade-off framework presented in Figure 6, with a brief
description of the significant states highlighted in the
legends below.

but not the ultimate, success. The V2G model of the
ownership development of RIEs is illustrated in Figure 7.
100%

Seed-financier
Knowledgeinvestors

Company Risk
High

0%
Prospective

A

Investable
“in 1 year”

Listable
“in 3 years”

Global Gazelle
“in 6-12 years”

Professional

Entrepreneur

Personal Risk

Y

High

Low
B

C

Traditional

X
D

Life Style

Low

FIGURE 6: THE EXPECTED MOVEMENTS IN PERSONALCOMPANY RISK TRADE-OFFS MATRIX.

Legends:
• A: Serial or Professional entrepreneur balancing the
personal risks in order to involve with riskier growth
businesses. Over time, the company risk reduces as
along with that of the entrepreneur’s.
• B: The risk-averse “traditional” entrepreneur’s personal
and company risks is decreased systematically and
incrementally.
• X: The entrepreneur could get involved in riskier
business (C), when the entrepreneur feels sufficiently
secure or the trajectory B steadily continues toward
position D.
• C: The sense of security could lead the entrepreneur to
engage in more risky business (Y).
• D: The life-style entrepreneur is self-employed without
high growth ambitions.
F. Findings #3 Towards V2G model
The empirical evidence suggests the rapidly-growing
younger firms: (i) expand their ownership base earlier; (ii)
they also go public early-on and; (iii) IPO is not the main
exit route for entrepreneurs, V2C actors or even venture
capitalists (VC). Thus, the shareholders’ exits is realized
mainly through holding stock that can be traded on the
stock exchange incrementally, which run counters to the
Solo, VC and V2C models proposed by Seppä & Näsi [3]
and Rasila [17]. IPO and listing on stock exchanges seem to
be a working mechanism for early stage financing,
incremental and partial exit for all stakeholders, incentives
for entrepreneurs and V2C actors and a measure of early,

V2C

VC

Stock market

FIGURE 7: V2G MODEL

Our findings suggest that founders reduce their personal
risks by exchanging part of their ownership stake for higher
salaries (especially after the IPO), stock options and partial
exits during the growth (as depicted in Figure 6).
Consequently, founders will gradually face similar
incentives to those of the co-entrepreneurs as well as the
hired managers, which support long-term commitment and
the separation of the key roles (manager, director and
owner). This evolution is actually required by the formal
and institutional investors and it resonates with good
governance principles requested by stock exchanges. Thus,
the Structure-Governance-Paradigm and the separation of
the roles (manager, director and owner) are fundamental
elements of the rapid growth ventures beyond V2C. This is
the essence of the proposed “Venture-to-Growth”, or V2G
for short, based on the in-dept study of RIEs.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In sum, V2C model’s focus is on early success of the
new venture so that it can reinforce the continuous growth
in the future. The V2C model is developed mainly from the
investor’s perspective. Overall, this perspective seems to
neglect both the entrepreneurs’ position and the purpose of
the venture to become a real growth company. When V2C
actors operate only between the seed stage and the formal
venture capital industry, this could lead entrepreneurs, coentrepreneurs and other stakeholders to attain a short term
financial gains and become short term-oriented; with the
prospects of longer term gains remaining uncertain. In order
to avoid the short-term perspective and gains among the
stakeholders, the grand exit should be avoided.
V2C model is probably applicable for most of the growth
companies; but for true RIEs or “global gazelles”, it is too
narrowly defined as intermediate actors and intermediating
stage. Similarly, the formal role of venture capitalist is not
convincing in RIE cases, because the traditional exit routes
(IPO or trade sale) are not the preferred exists any more as
the actual growth can be financed by the financial
institutions (e.g., bank loans). Thus, there is more room for
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formal and institutional investors (e.g., Small Capital
Investment Funds).
V2G model goes beyond V2C model and proposes an
entrepreneur’s personal view of the risks and returns as
compared to that of the firm’s risks-return trade-offs. At the
growth stages, the partnership of co-entrepreneurs and VC
or IPO also means risk sharing for the original entrepreneur
or founder. Larger group of founders and early stage actors
allow the entrepreneur to consider him or herself
differently, even lower the “risk” of his or her job than the
traditional entrepreneurs. V2G model combine the best
parts of the roles as an entrepreneur (owner) and hired
manager. Thus, in this case, it is not any more only “your”
firm, but a rapidly-growing enterprise with the
corresponding V2G mindset. This V2G mindset avoids
negative effect of a single owner. The separation of the
roles of the owner and manager will allow the entrepreneurfounder to adequately cope with them. In sum, V2G model
points out three proposals: first, it examines risks and
returns from entrepreneur’s individual viewpoint; secondly
it explores risks and ambitions between individual and
enterprise; and finally it describes the importance of the
ownership development of the enterprise and development
of the value of the enterprise as depicted in Figure 7.
The public policy implication should not be lost on those
who formulate growth-oriented policies or whose policies
impact growth of younger and smaller enterprises. As an
example of such policies, formal investors and private
individuals should be encouraged to invest in earlier-on
IPO than what is advocated by the VC community.
Similarly, the environment must allow, if not cover, for
early IPO as an instrument of raising public funds for
growth as opposed to financial exit for the VC community.
Unfortunately, public policy authorities seem to lag
behind what is actually needed and thus neither aspiring
firms benefit from public-support program; nor can they
leverage such support to create employment and wealth
even faster than what they have already achieved.
Naturally, the formulation of a family of conducive policies
not only can help these V2G enterprises (that we call hasty
gazelles). Their rapid growth may also stimulate other
similar smaller firms to create employment, innovation and
wealth even faster than their larger counterparts and with
higher velocities than ever before. Simply stated, the
preponderance of a policy environment capable of
supporting rapid growth (i.e., an average 9800% in five
years) versus normal growth (e.g., 5% to 10% annually to
result in 20% to 45% in 5 years) should not be lost (see
Figure 8). Similarly, there is strong need for understanding
lessons from the pattern of the case firms’ processes,
practices and strategies [for more details see 5, 23, 24, 25,
26].

Value of the venture
V2G model

V2C model

Lonely walk

Time

FIGURE 8: A COMPARATIVE TRAJECTORY OF GROWTH FOR
V2C, V2G AND LONELY WALK.
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